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Introduction
Hong Kong and Singapore are two societies that experienced Japan-ese expansionism in the twentieth century while under British colo-nial rule. Hong Kong had been ceded by the Qing government to
the British in 1842 following the First Opium War, while Singapore was
“founded” by an official from the British East India Company in 1819. During
World War II, both societies experienced Japanese military assault, swift ca-
pitulation by the colonial authorities, followed by three and a half years of
occupation that caused hardship and suffering among the local population.
Given this, it is unsurprising that the narratives of invasion and occupation
in Hong Kong and Singapore share similarities. However, the way in which
the respective governments use memory of the war and Occupation in their
efforts to shape national identity, as reflected in official history curricula
and officially-vetted school textbooks, evince significant differences. This
article compares the ways in which Japan has been portrayed as an “Other”
in Hong Kong and Singapore in school textbooks in the period since the
1980s, focussing particularly on those texts currently in use. The portrayal
of Japan is interpreted with reference to the socio-political context, and the
approach to the construction of national identity, in the two societies.
Following the Japanese surrender, Hong Kong and Singapore were returned
to British rule. Singapore remained under British control until it gained self-
government in 1959, with independence following six years later, while
Hong Kong was reunified with the Chinese mainland in 1997. Since achiev-
ing self-rule, Singapore has been governed by the People’s Action Party. Al-
though its population is predominantly Chinese, it is known as a
multicultural society because of the significant proportion of other ethnic
groups: in 2012, the Chinese made up 74.1% of the population, Malays
13.4%, Indians 9.2%, and others 3.3%. (1) Singapore is a democracy in that
the government is elected through popular suffrage, although the style of
governance has often been described as soft authoritarianism, and the
media is subject to strong official control. By contrast, the end of colonialism
in Hong Kong heralded not independence but the incorporation of the ter-
ritory into the People’s Republic of China as a “Special Administrative Re-
gion” under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. Its government is
headed by a Chief Executive who is not popularly elected, but is chosen by
an Election Committee approved by Beijing. While Hongkongers cannot
choose the Chief Executive, there is a free press and a strong civil society.
Today, the Hong Kong population is 94% Han Chinese, with the remaining
6% comprising Indonesians, Filipinos, Whites, Indians, Pakistanis, Nepalese,
Japanese, Thais, other Asians, and others. (2)
For the people of Hong Kong and Singapore, the Japanese Occupation
constituted a significant and in some cases traumatic historical episode,
and the experience of being invaded and occupied by foreign troops created
a strong sense of the “Other.” The concept of the “Other” has been ex-
pounded on by a number of scholars in different contexts. Mead (3) writes
about the “generalised other” with reference to the social roles and norms
that children play with in the process of developing a self; de Beauvoir (4)
examines how women are regarded as the “Other,” with men as the primary,
“essential” subject; Said’s (5) interest is in the notion of Orientalism, and the
view of the Orient in contradistinction to the West; on her part, Spivak (6)
uses the term “subaltern” to refer to colonial subjects who were of a lower
status than the European elites, while Bauman’s (7) focus was on the indi-
viduals or groups within a society who were stigmatised as the “excluded
Other.” What many of these writings share is the claim that attempts to
classify a particular group necessarily involve the creation of individuals or
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groups who are excluded from this classification. As de Beauvoir puts it, “No
group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other
over against itself.” (8) There is therefore a sense in which the self and “Other”
are conceptually related, with the “Other” (or “Others”) typically central to
the way in which a group or community defines itself. 
A nation has been described as “an imagined political community,” (9) with
some scholars attempting to define the nation and national identity with
reference to shared culture. (10) Gellner believes that to do so casts the net
too wide, as it may bring in cases that do not fit most understandings of a
“nation”; he also observes that a nation comes about under certain condi-
tions:
…when general social conditions make for standardized, homoge-
neous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations
and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined
educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly
the only kind of unit with which men (sic) willingly and often ar-
dently identify. (11)
Nation states perform a number of roles to bring about the conditions for
creating and sustaining a nation, and to foster a sense of national identity.
As Bauman puts it in hyperbolic fashion:
They laud and enforce the ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural homo-
geneity. They are engaged in incessant propaganda of shared atti-
tudes. They construct joint historical memories and do their best to
discredit or suppress such stubborn memories as cannot be squeezed
into shared tradition… They preach the sense of common mission,
common fate, common destiny. They breed, or at least legitimize and
give tacit support to, animosity towards everyone standing outside
the holy union. (12) (original emphasis)
Of the conceptions of the “Other” listed above, it is Bauman’s that comes
closest in terms of describing the way in which Japan is used by the political
elites in Hong Kong and Singapore to define their respective societies. As
will be seen, Japan is sometimes used as a contrast to define what a society
is – or what its members would like to think it is – as well as a model of
what they want it to be. Japan is by no means the only, or even the main,
“Other” for Hong Kong and Singapore. As societies that have experienced
British colonial rule, the British or the “West” also feature as significant
“Others,” and regional neighbours (China for Hong Kong, especially prior
to 1997, and Malaysia and Indonesia for Singapore) came to loom larger
as Britain headed for the imperial exit. This article will focus on the por-
trayal of Japan: although the Occupation took place seven decades ago,
and for a relatively brief period, it still plays a significant role in history
textbooks today. 
Hong Kong and Singapore use a centrally mandated curriculum. Textbooks
are commercially produced, but are written according to curriculum guide-
lines issued by the education bureau or ministry, and subject to i ts approval.
Hence, while schools are able to choose from a range of commercially avail-
able textbooks, the views in the texts invariably reflect those of the gov-
ernment, and present the official, approved narrative and values. Through
comparing the historical narratives of textbooks used in the two societies,
this article will analyse the images of Japan that they convey, and the po-
litical ends that these are used to serve. 
There are a number of studies that have analysed Hong Kong and Singa-
pore in isolation with respect to the use of history, and how the school cur-
riculum and textbooks portray the Japanese. (13) The present article will draw
on this body of work, and on recent original research (14) carried out by mem-
bers of the Leverhulme International Network on Japan and East Asia Na-
tional Identities, (15) in which I am a key participant. By drawing together
these single country studies, the article will present a comparative analysis
of the representation of Japan in history textbooks in Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore, particularly with respect to the Japanese Occupation. By placing
these portrayals in social and political context, it will show how these have
been influenced by domestic situations and considerations. 
The Portrayal of Japan in Hong Kong and
Singapore
Singapore
In Singapore, history as a compulsory subject is taught in two subjects in
secondary school – History and Social Studies. In her study of Social Studies
textbooks, Kho speaks of the “single dominant perspective,” (16) and I have
elsewhere written about the “overriding sense of a single, approved narra-
tive” (17) that is presented in the texts. This perspective or narrative refers to
the particular interpretation of history – locally referred to as the Singapore
Story – that is approved by the political elite, and that conveys the values
and messages they consider necessary for the country’s future and survival.
According to this interpretation, the modern history of Singapore begins
with its founding by a British official Stamford Raffles in 1819; the story
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then continues through the colonial period, and World War II when Japan
invades and occupies the country, followed by the return to British rule,
merger with Malaysia, and independence; there then follows the years of
struggle to make Singapore the success it is today. 
Interestingly, significant coverage of the Japanese Occupation in history texts
only started from 1984, and should be seen as part of wider efforts aimed at
promoting a particular vision of national identity and values. Political sociali-
sation is usually carried out through Civics and Moral Education, in which values
such as respect, responsibility, integrity, care, resilience, and harmony (18) are
promoted alongside the National Education messages centred on the impor-
tance of being rooted to the country, and the willingness to defend it. (19) The
(re)introduction of the Japanese Occupation into the curriculum should there-
fore be viewed as part of these efforts to impress on young Singaporeans the
values and messages deemed to be essential for the survival of the country. 
The inclusion of the war and Occupation in school history texts from the
1980s was not the first time there had been reference to Japan in Singapore.
Avenell has written about the “Learn from Japan” campaign that was con-
ducted during the same period, in which Japan was held up by the political
leaders as a model for Singapore, and campaigns were conducted to pro-
mote “Japanese” approaches to productivity, work ethic and labour-man-
agement relations. Japan’s economic success and its productive and
harmonious workplaces were linked to its societal values, which were in-
terpreted as broadly “Asian.” (20)
Where the primary history textbooks are concerned, Saito, Alviar-Martin,
and Khong note how the portrayal of the Japanese contrasts with that of
the British: the latter are “depicted as a partner and decision-maker – al-
though acting primarily in self-interest,” while the former are “represented
as a violent aggressor that ruled Singapore with severity and harshness.” (21)
Khamsi and Morris’s study of lower secondary texts between 1985 and
2007 focuses on the ethnic element in Japanese rule, and provides an analy-
sis of how the focus of the coverage of the war and Occupation has shifted
from one that stressed Chinese suffering, and the role of the Chinese during
this period, to one that consciously represents the experience of all ethnic
groups equally. They argue that this has effectively meant a shift from an
ethno-cultural portrayal of the nation to one that is more multi-cultural. (22)
The recent and more comprehensive analysis of the lower secondary history
textbooks between 1985 and 2007 by Khamsi and myself (23) elaborates on the
earlier work of the scholars cited above. The analysis shows the way in which
the texts emphasise the cruelty of the Japanese. In the current text, for instance,
one chapter – entitled “How did World War II affect Singapore?”, and comprising
33 pages – is devoted to the war and Occupation and the immediate post-war
period. (24) In it, there is reference to the Sook Ching, which is described as an
operation aiming “to identify and eliminate suspected anti-Japanese elements
among the Chinese community.” (25) There is also reference to the savage and
unpredictable violence to which the local population was subjected:
The Japanese used fear to rule Singapore. The cruelty of the Kem-
peitai (26) kept people in a constant state of anxiety and fear.
At the slightest offence, punishment was swift and severe. Many anti-
Japanese subjects were subjected to terrible torture or decapitation
at the Kempeitai centres. (27)
A highlighted text box describes an incident in which individuals identified
as anti-Japanese are taken in lorries to a beach, and provides an eyewitness
account of what follows:
We were next told to move off towards the sea. When all of us were
in the water, the machine guns opened fire. I was at the far end of
my group. When my companions were hit, they fell down and pulled
down the rest of us. As I fell, I was hit on the face by a bullet. The
machine guns then stopped firing. The soldiers came round to knife
us with their bayonets. I shut my eyes. A soldier stepped on me to
knife my neighbour. He did not turn to knife me. I kept my eyes shut.
After some time, I heard the sound of lorries driving off. (28)
The texts also portray the Japanese as discriminatory rulers, who take for
themselves “the best of everything: rice, sugar, meat, fish, whisky and ciga-
rettes” (29) in a time of severe shortages. The Japanese are also depicted as
imposing an alien culture in their attempts to “Japanise” the local population
by promoting the “Japanese spirit,” Japanese symbols of national identity
such as their national anthem, and the Japanese language. (30)
Where there is collaboration, this is placed within the context of the meth-
ods used by the Japanese. In addition to the local population being subject
to coercive methods used to extract information, (31) the Chinese as a group
are “made” to make large contributions to the Japanese as a punishment
for having supported the anti-Japanese war effort in mainland China. (32) By
attributing to the Japanese the capacity for brutality and manipulation, the
texts absolve the local people of personal responsibility for collaboration. 
The overall effect of the portrayal of the Japanese Occupation is a layering
on of details describing the horrors of an enemy occupation – the power-
lessness in the face of the occupying force, the ever-present possibility of
violence, and the humiliation to person and country. 
While the focus in the 1980s texts is on the suffering of the Chinese, (33)
the emphasis in the later texts is on common suffering, and care is taken to
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feature individuals from the various ethnic groups who put up heroic resist-
ance against the Japanese. 
Notwithstanding the traditional portrayal of the Japanese as the historical
enemy, the imperial army is also presented in an unexpectedly positive way.
As well as their capacity for brutality, there is reference to their military ef-
fectiveness: the Japanese are loyal to their country and Emperor, and de-
termined and willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause; they also employ
astute military tactics that succeed in taking in the British. (34) In contrast,
the British are disorganised and make tactical errors; above all, they lack
commitment to the country, and abandon it in its hour of need. (35) Here,
the message is that it is the commitment and loyalty of the Japanese troops
that give them military success, and it is precisely this lack of commitment
on the part of the British that led to the Occupation and the years of suf-
fering. 
In the narrative, therefore, the Japanese are presented as an “Other” to
both the local population and the British. This otherness is emphasised in
the way the Japanese are characterised: brutal invaders and incompetent
and discriminatory occupiers who seek to impose their alien culture, and
whose actions cause great suffering to the local population. In emphasising
common suffering among the various ethnic groups, divisiveness among the
local population is avoided, and common unity fostered. The Japanese are
also depicted as very different from the British in their loyalty, commitment,
and military strategy. In this, the ineffectual British “Other” serves as a con-
trast to highlight the qualities of the Japanese that make them militarily
successful.
In a chapter leading up to the World War II, schoolchildren are told with
respect to colonial rule that:
Asians were often discriminated (sic) by the British government. For
example, in the government service, most of the high-ranking offi-
cials were Europeans and well-qualified Asians were not given senior
or important posts. (36)
Despite this, British colonial rule is generally positively presented:
Singapore fared well under British rule. There was order, security, and
general improvements to the people’s standard of living. (37)
This benevolent-but-discriminatory portrayal of the British serves to high-
light the brutality and incompetence of the Japanese as rulers. Taken to-
gether, the British and Japanese “Others” – the one discriminatory,
ineffectual, and uncommitted, and the other effective in battle but brutal
in occupation – make the point that Singaporeans can and should only de-
pend on themselves when it comes to ruling and defending their country. 
Where Japan is concerned, it serves as both a negative and positive model.
It represents the historical enemy – as well as potential enemies – against
which a nation needs to be prepared to defend itself. It is an also example
to be emulated if a people are to retain their freedom, particularly with re-
spect to the qualities that make an army effective. 
The attempt to use the Japanese “Other” as a model in schools is part of
a wider effort by the political elite to use Japan as an Asian example of eco-
nomic development and nation building. As an Asian country that had suc-
cessfully industrialised and – in the process – combined the best qualities
of East and West, the political leaders considered Japan an appropriate
model of development for Singapore. As Avenell notes, during the 1980s,
“‘Japan’, freely imagined [...], served as a useful ideological device for gov-
ernmental elites as they attempted to manage and shape the social and
economic transformations accompanying the shift to advanced industrial-
ization in their country.” (38) In the history texts, Japan is presented as the
first Asian nation to challenge the superiority of the West. In this, the nar-
rative accepts at least some of the discourse in Japan with regard to the
war being waged in East and South-East Asia to stand up to the exploitative
and colonial “West,” and uses this to stiffen the sinews of Singaporeans in
nation building, and inspire a young Asian nation to take its place in the
world. 
Hong Kong
In Hong Kong schools, history is covered in two subjects at the upper sec-
ondary level: traditionally, Chinese History focuses on the five thousand
years of Chinese civilisation, and History (sometimes referred to as “World
History”) on modern Chinese history. The work of scholars such as Vickers,
Kan, and Morris (39) demonstrates that, in the period leading up to the retro-
cession, history – particularly Chinese History – was used to promote a Han-
centred view of the past, foster a Chinese cultural identity, and socialise
young people into the values and norms associated with Chinese culture. It
was an identity rooted in a classical past, and detached from current reali-
ties, because the British government needed to depoliticise the curriculum
to avoid threats to its legitimacy. (40) As the Chinese History curriculum was
updated in the 1980s and 1990s to encompass more twentieth-century
history, coverage of modern Japan’s aggression against China has increased
accordingly. History was traditionally more influenced by Western (i.e.
Anglo-Saxon) educational theory and practice, and officials responsible for
this subject increasingly espoused a concern with teaching “skills” of his-
torical analysis; in 1996, a year before the handover, the curriculum was ex-
panded to include Hong Kong history, and further revisions in 2003 led to
the inclusion of local history at senior secondary level, as well as an in-
creased focus on the twentieth century. (41)
In their recent analysis of the treatment of Japan in the most popular sen-
ior secondary History (1996, 2004, and 2009) and Chinese History (1993,
2005, and 2009) textbooks, Morris and Vickers identify certain trends before
and after the retrocession. (42) The portrayal of Japan in History up to the
1990s is quite positive because of its focus on the Meiji Restoration: the
overriding theme is admiration for Japan’s rapid modernisation and nation
building, although there is no mention of the country’s contribution to late
Qing reforms. In this, as in the Singapore texts, the “West” is an implied
“Other” to both China/Hong Kong and Japan: it is the “benchmark for
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‘modernity’,” and also a force of aggression (43) that East Asian societies need
to catch up with in order to engage on a more equal footing. In the post-
1997 texts, the positive portrayal gives way to a more negative one in which
the focus on militarism and Japan’s modernisation is portrayed as part of a
process of relentless militarisation and conquest. 
Hence, Japanese militarism is covered in both History and Chinese History.
The 1993, 2005, and 2009 editions of the Chinese History texts feature
chapters on “Japan’s Invasion of China,” “China’s All-Out Resistance against
Japan’s Invasion,” and “China’s Foreign Policy during the War of Resistance.”
In the later texts, this coverage is expanded to include a new section on
“Japan’s fierce attack on China’s rear base” (i.e. the bombing of Chongqing
and Kunming). At the same time, the terminology in the later texts is
matched to that on the mainland: for instance, the chapter title “Sino-
Japanese War” in the 1993 text becomes “War of Resistance against Japan”
in the 2005 text, wording similar to that used in mainland textbooks. And,
as with history textbooks in Singapore and other countries in East Asia, (44)
the Chinese History texts describe Japanese atrocities in all their brutality:
there are accounts of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, and other atrocities such
as Japanese soldiers bayoneting or beheading Chinese victims or burying
them alive, with the number of photographs of such atrocities increasing in
the later texts. (45) Hence, there is significant – and increased – coverage of
Japanese brutality and atrocities on the mainland. 
In addition, there has been a clear overall shift over the years in the way
Japan is presented, especially in the History texts, where Japan morphs from
a model of modernisation to one of militarism. Japan is also presented as an
“Other” to Hongkongers and, particularly in the post-1997 texts, an “Other”
that Hongkongers share with their mainland compatriots: Japanese brutality
on the mainland is increasingly used to highlight Chinese suffering and vic-
timhood, and to create a sense of shared history and identity. The matching
of the terminology in the Chinese History texts concerning the invasion and
occupation of China with that used in mainland texts reinforces this intent.
The attempt to encourage Hongkongers to share the wartime experience on
the mainland needs to be seen as part of a wider strategy to appeal to a
common set of cultural values and experiences; alongside the promotion of
common, “traditional” Chinese values and culture on the mainland as in Hong
Kong, (46) it is part of ongoing efforts to bring about deeper reunification be-
tween the Special Administrative Region and the mainland.
In addition to Japan, there is also the British or Western “Other.” The “West”
was the model for Japan in its early modernisation, a process that is framed
in terms of Japan’s need to defend itself against the former’s aggression; at
the same time, the point is made that, “while adopting Western practices,
the Japanese were conscious of keeping their traditional values and spirit.” (47)
Here, the “West” is both a positive model for modernisation for Japan and,
by implication, Hong Kong and the mainland. And Japan’s ability to mod-
ernise without losing its national spirit could be endorsed by today’s Chinese
Communist Party, and used to support its approach to modernisation. (48)
When it comes to the war and Occupation in Hong Kong, one chapter –
“The political and institutional changes during Japanese occupation, 1941-
1945” – is devoted to this in the current, most widely used History text (49);
it is six pages long. (50) As the title suggests, the chapter focuses on political
and institutional changes during the Occupation, and the Japanese attack,
Occupation, and government are treated in an objective and largely dispas-
sionate way. With regard to the experience of the local people during the
Occupation, the text – with considerable understatement – describes Japan-
ese “attention to people’s quality of living” as being “very limited.” (51) There
is mention of shortages and rationing, the worst of this, when “rice was in
short supply,” being that “people had to eat tree leaves and roots out of
hunger.” (52) There is also mention of the Repatriation Scheme in which, in
an effort to ease the pressure on limited resources, the Japanese authorities
instituted a policy to return local residents to the mainland:
Repatriation policy meant forcing the residents to return to the
mainland through persuasion and coercion. By December 1942, as
many as 600,000 people had left Hong Kong. (53)
There is also reference to the Japanisation policy:
Japanese language, Japanese culture and the national affairs of Japan
were taught in schools. Some of the streets and buildings were given
Japanese names. (54)
In contrast with the coverage of the Occupation in the Singapore texts,
there is relatively little focus on human suffering, and an absence of the use
of emotive language. Where the Japanese are clearly marked out as the bru-
tal occupying enemy in the case of Singapore, they are strangely absent
from the Hong Kong narrative; the focus instead falls overwhelmingly on
the local Chinese community, as is true more broadly of the coverage of
local history in Hong Kong texts. (55) Of the six pages in the chapter, one and
a half pages are taken up by the description of the system of government
that was set up under the Japanese, and these highlight the part played by
local residents. Here, the Japanese are portrayed in a slightly positive light,
and the attempt to incorporate the local Chinese into the system is seen
as “a breakthrough for Chinese participation in the political system.” (56) At
the same time, the local elite who collaborated with the Japanese are de-
picted as performing a positive role:
Chinese leaders […] had no choice but to cooperate with the Japan-
ese. […] [T]hey repeatedly took risks in demanding the Japanese gov-
ernment to improve food supply, keep social order, adopt health
measures against epidemics and maintain economic production.
Such actual work managed to ease the hardship of some Hong Kong
citizens… (57)
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 43
43. Paul Morris and Edward Vickers, “Reconstructing the Nation,” art. cit.
44. See, for instance, the article on Chinese history textbooks by Edward Vickers and Yang Biao in this issue.
45. Paul Morris and Edward Vickers, “Reconstructing the Nation,” art. cit.
46. Ibid.
47. Wong, W. F., New Certificate World History (Vol. 1), Hong Kong, Hong Kong Educational Publishing,
1996, p. 84.
48. Paul Morris and Edward Vickers, “Reconstructing the Nation,” art. cit.
49. Wong W.F., Leung K.P., Ho W.C., Chui C.P. and Cheung K.W., New Horizon History (Theme A), Hong
Kong Educational Publishing Co., 2009.
50. In Hong Kong, textbooks follow the official syllabus quite closely, and the syllabus specifies the
topics and subtopics to a level of detail sufficient to indicate to commercial textbook producers
where the emphasis in coverage should lie. 




55. See Edward Vickers and Flora Kan, “The Reeducation of Hong Kong,” art. cit., p. 215.
56. Wong W.F., Leung K.P., Ho W.C., Chui C.P. and Cheung K.W., New Horizon History, op. cit., p. 24.
57. Victor Zheng and Charles Chow, 2006, cited in Wong W.F., Leung K.P., Ho W.C., Chui C.P. and Cheung
K.W., New Horizon History, op. cit, p. 24.
Christine Han – Wartime Enemy or “Asian” Model?
When it comes to Hong Kong itself, therefore, the portrayal of the Japan-
ese invasion and Occupation is very different in tone and emphasis from
that in Singapore, where it is used to drum up antipathy to the invading
forces and, with this, a sense of common identity and purpose. In the Hong
Kong text, there is a largely dispassionate depiction of the Occupation, and
an emphatically pro-establishment account of the development of the
Hong Kong Chinese community. The focus is on Hong Kong social history,
and the contribution of the local Chinese elite to maintaining the stability
of local society through difficult times. The effort to generate fear and hos-
tility towards the occupying forces and, hence, a sense of a people under
siege needing to pull together, is focussed entirely on the experience of Chi-
nese on the mainland, through the accounts of mainland atrocities and suf-
fering in Chinese History. The History text even manages to give a positive
spin to its account of the Japanese Occupation, by focusing especially on
the role of local Chinese elites, and emphasising the developments during
this period that laid the basis for improvements in the rights and autonomy
of the local Chinese community after the war. The efforts made by the
Japanese authorities to secure the collaboration of the local elite are repre-
sented as an advance on the lack of participatory involvement before the
Occupation, and as a harbinger of further progress in co-opting local elites
after the war; this episode is thus slotted neatly into a smooth narrative of
improvement, in which the continued dominance of a coterie of established
tycoons is implicitly represented as part of the natural order of things. 
The coverage of Japan is extended into the post-war period and, in the
post-1997 History texts, the blame for international disputes, such as visits
to the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands, is placed on Japanese lead-
ers. (58) At the same time, Japan’s recent political problems are attributed to
the frequent changes of government resulting from its democratic system,
while the long dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party over the political
landscape is described approvingly as having provided the necessary stabil-
ity for stability for successful modernisation. (59) Here, again, the message
that a single-party state would be best for a country’s stability and devel-
opment would not be one that the Communist Party would dispute. When
it comes to the coverage of local history, however, the very significant role
played in Hong Kong’s economic development by trade with Japan (the ter-
ritory’s largest trading partner for most of the post-war period until the
1970s), and the huge impact of Japanese popular culture on its local coun-
terpart, receive almost no mention whatsoever. (60) Not only Japanese, but
also British agency in Hong Kong’s post-war history is accorded little ac-
knowledgement. By contrast, no opportunity is lost to emphasise the “con-
tributions” made by China to Hong Kong’s development. (61)
Hence, despite its relatively short duration, the Occupation, together
with aspects of history involving the Japanese, feature significantly in the
history curriculum in Hong Kong and Singapore. Japan is portrayed as the
historical enemy through narratives of invasion, war, occupation, and suf-
fering, and the strength of this negative portrayal has increased markedly
over time. The manner of the portrayal differs in the two societies: in Sin-
gapore, the emphasis is on common suffering and the united response
among the local population, while in Hong Kong, the atrocities and suf-
fering that are highlighted are those on the mainland, and are intended
to foster identification. However, Japan is also occasionally portrayed in
an unexpectedly positive light. There is recognition of its success in early
modernisation and post-war reconstruction, and even admiration for the
bravery and effectiveness of its imperial army; there is also appreciation
for the first opportunity it presents for local participation. Hence, the de-
piction of Japan in the history textbooks is Janus-like, and the “face” that
is presented, and the manner in which this is done, has changed over time
according to the requirements of political socialisation as perceived by
each society's governing elites. 
At the same time, Japan is presented as an “Other” to the local population,
as well as other significant countries and regions, especially Britain and the
“West.” In Singapore, the cruelty of the Japanese troops – particularly the
Kempeitai – and the selfishness of the Occupation administration are high-
lighted and contrasted with the innocent victimhood and stoicism of the
local people. In both Hong Kong and Singapore, the Japanese are presented
in contradistinction to the British. The latter are seen as discriminatory colo-
nial rulers in the two societies, and their reluctance to allow political par-
ticipation in Hong Kong makes the limited participation under the Japanese
seem progress by comparison, while in Singapore, their benevolent but in-
effectual approach is shown to be powerless when faced with ruthless, ef-
ficient, and committed Japanese troops. Highlighting the alien nature of
Japanese brutality – with respect to the atrocities committed by imperial
troops, for instance – also enables a society to define itself in terms of the
normal and the good. In addition, the experience of suffering under the
Japanese “Other” is used as a force for unity – unity with mainlanders in
the case of Hong Kong, and among the different ethnic groups for Singapore.
The qualities of the Japanese also highlight by contrast the moral inferiority
and weaknesses of the British or Western “Other”: despite being portrayed
in places as a positive model of modernisation, Britain is nonetheless a mil-
itary aggressor, and a foreign ruler that is unwilling to allow local participa-
tion, or is benevolent but ineffectual and uncommitted. The point is that
both the Japanese and British were unsatisfactory rulers, and represent an
unlamented colonial past in the official historical narratives of Hong Kong
and Singapore. 
Highlighting the alien and brutal nature of the Japanese “Other” also en-
ables a society to define itself in terms of the civic virtues that it wishes its
people to acquire. These virtues are most clearly stated in Singapore, where
they take the form of the National Education messages. In this, the Japanese
serve as the once and future bogeyman, an example not only of what has
happened, but also what could happen to the local population, if they fail
to take seriously the vulnerability of the country and its defence. Here, the
portrayal of the Japanese is unexpectedly positive in that their military
prowess is something to be emulated. The positive portrayal of strong Japan-
ese military leaders, and the commitment and effectiveness of their troops,
suggest that what is required in Singapore is strong leadership – a role that
the ruling People’s Action Party would be willing to continue to perform –
and the unswerving loyalty of its people to the country and its leaders. 
Japan is also a positive role model for modernisation. In the earlier Hong
Kong texts, there is admiration for its efforts at modernisation and nation
building, not just with respect to the military, but also the economy. The
deliberately selective nature of the admiration can be seen from the fact
that it is limited. It was noted how the Hong Kong texts do not mention
Japan’s contribution to reforms in the late Qing period in China. Admiration
for Japan therefore stops short of acknowledgement of the country’s cul-
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tural debt to the historical enemy. This omission upholds the portrayal of a
five-thousand-year-old Chinese civilisation essentially unsullied by external
influence, least of all that of the nation's most hated foe; and thus avoids
implicitly devaluing this unparalleled gift from China to humanity as a
whole, and the Communist regime's recently much-vaunted role as its cus-
todian. 
Finally, the narrative in the texts provides support for the current domestic
social and political directions adopted by the political leaders. In the Hong
Kong texts, the focus is on shared suffering with the mainland and the need
for national unity, and past strong political leadership in Japan is used to
justify a strong state. At the same time, current Japanese foreign policy ac-
tions are implicitly associated with past villainy so that the victims – the
Special Administrative Region and the mainland – are able to claim the
same relationship in ongoing international disputes with Japan, and to con-
tinue to occupy the moral high ground. In the case of Singapore, the narra-
tive is strongly derived from that of the People’s Action Party and – in
stressing the need for strong leadership, self reliance, multiculturalism, and
communal values – reinforces its discourse. Hence, the past is recast and
used to justify a society’s – and its political leadership’s – position and vision
at the present time. 
Discussion: Implications of the portrayals of
Japan for conceptions of identity and
“Chineseness”
The ways in which Japan is portrayed in history has implications for the
construction of nationhood (including “Chineseness”), and how this can be
understood. This section will show how images of Japan have been manip-
ulated by the state elite in an attempt to construct diverse forms of identity
consciousness – in certain times and places emphasising a sense of “Chine-
seness” or national distinctiveness. 
There is a literature on nationalism and national identity formation that
has focussed on the distinction between civic and ethno-cultural nationalism.
Ethnic nationalism is largely characterised in terms of a focus on common
descent, and civic nationalism by civic institutions. The way Smith makes
the distinction is typical: nations with a civic form of nationalism “have a
measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common under-
standings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the population
together in their homeland.” (62) As Brown puts it, the nation is thus “defined
in terms of a shared commitment to, and pride in, the public institutions of
state and civil society, which connect the people to the territory they oc-
cupy.” (63) In contrast, nations that are conceived in ethnic or ethno-cultural
terms are essentially “a community of common descent,” and emphasise
the “community of birth and ethnic culture.” (64) Hence, the concept that
forms the basis of these nations is “ethnocultural sameness.” (65) Sociologists
of nationalism have generally abandoned attempts to make clear distinctions
between ethnic and civic nationalism because they recognise that historical
cases of nations and nationalism usually involve a combination of the two,
and hence that there is a need to find other ways to conceptualise nation-
alism. (66) Nonetheless, the theoretical distinction between the two, which
represent opposite ends on a spectrum, is useful in the present context be-
cause the ways in which Japan-related history is presented cast an interesting
light on the transition in the form of nationalism in the two societies. 
It was noted that Chinese History in Hong Kong has traditionally pro-
moted a Han-centred view of the past, and has attempted to socialise
young people into the values and norms associated with a conservative,
highly Han-centric vision of Chinese culture. In Singapore, there are efforts
to encourage ethnic identity and culture by requiring schoolchildren to learn
their “mother tongue” (referred to as the “second language”), in addition to
the English language; there is even an annual national campaign to encour-
age the speaking of Mandarin. (67)
In the current history texts in Hong Kong and Singapore, there is reference
to the efforts of the Japanese to “Japanise” the local population, which rep-
resent a threat to local culture(s). Alongside this in Hong Kong is the em-
phasis in Chinese History on the glories of the Chinese (i.e. Han) cultural
heritage. Where political union may still be fraught for some Hongkongers,
a longstanding common culture, and the sharing of the experience of main-
land suffering, is used to override the modern experiences that separate
them from their mainland compatriots, such as years of colonialism and
differences in political ideology. The emphasis on the purity of Chinese civil-
isation and on Japanese aggression, particularly in the later History texts,
reflects assumptions concerning the homogeneity of Chinese identity and
the collective moral superiority of the Chinese nation. In political terms, the
reference to traditional Chinese culture brings to mind the role of custodian
of Chinese civilisation that the Communist Party has latterly undertaken,
and serves to undergird its political legitimacy to govern the mainland and
the Special Administrative Region.
Where Singapore is concerned, explicit references to “Chineseness” are
notable for their absence. It comes up primarily in the context of the differ-
ent treatment meted out by the Japanese to the various ethnic groups dur-
ing the Occupation. In multi-ethnic Singapore, these differences are
downplayed, and what is highlighted instead is the common experience of
suffering and the resulting inter-communal unity, with care being taken to
ensure that texts feature war heroes from the different communities. This
is not to say that “Chineseness” is unimportant in the Singapore context.
Indeed, the emphasis in the texts on the attempt to “Japanise” the local
population strongly suggests an attack on local ethnic cultures. But, in light
of the potentially divisive effect that references to differential treatment by
the Japanese may engender, it has been considered politic to present the
Occupation as a common, unifying experience for the local population.
Here, the implicit claim to legitimacy on the part of the ruling People’s Ac-
tion Party is its ability to bring about the conditions, and nurture the req-
uisite qualities, for peace and harmony in a multi-ethnic society. 
We have seen how historical memory – the creation of a shared past and
a consciousness of common suffering under an enemy – has been used in
both societies to foster national unity and identity. But beyond the sense
of national identity is the question as to the form of nationalism that un-
derpins it. Where Hong Kong is concerned, there is no popularly elected par-
liament, but there was and still is strong freedom of the press and
expression. There is also a clear sense of civic identity in which the role of
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civic action, and the more symbolic role of the “rule of law” as a concept,
distinguishes Hong Kong from the mainland. (68) This can be seen in the pen-
chant among the population to turn out to demonstrate, either on major
anniversaries such as that of the Tiananmen Square Massacre (4 June), or
simply issues relating to perceived violations of freedoms or rights. In the
face of this, the attempt to encourage Hongkongers to share the historical
experience of mainlanders, and the emphasis on a shared cultural heritage,
reflect an official drive to portray the ties that bind local people to “the na-
tion” in increasingly ethno-cultural terms. (69) The account in the history
texts of a Chinese civilisation unsullied by Japanese influence is a case in
point. For the Chinese Communist Party, the promotion of a civic form of
nationalism is unlikely to be attractive, given the attachment that
Hongkongers already have to civic institutions such as freedom of the press
and expression; hence, the appeal to an ethno-cultural form of nationalism
would be more acceptable both to the Party and Hongkongers. In 2003 and
2012, there were large public protests against, respectively, the introduction
of an anti-subversion law and the compulsory school subject National and
Moral Education; these measures were resisted precisely because they went
beyond a focus on a shared cultural heritage. Protests such as these raise
questions as to how attractive deeper political unification is to Hongkongers
beyond the appeal to cultural heritage. 
Singapore treads a delicate path between ethno-cultural and civic forms
of nationalism. As a Chinese majority society amidst non-Chinese neigh-
bours, Singapore has long had to battle fears of being a Third China (the first
two being the mainland and Taiwan). At the same time, the political elite
are suspicious of “Chinese chauvinists,” who they fear wish to promote Chi-
nese culture and interests at the expense of social harmony. Despite this,
there are policies promoted by the political leaders that are underpinned
by an essentialist view of ethnicity, one in which values and culture are seen
to be necessarily embedded in the individual’s ethno-cultural heritage. For
instance, ethnic culture and identity are encouraged, and even enforced, by
the requirement that, in addition to English, children should learn a second
language associated with their ethnic group. Indeed, the former Prime Min-
ister Lee Kuan Yew was – for a time in the 1990s – a self-appointed
spokesman for “Confucian” (subsequently, “Asian”) values. In the history
texts, however, “Chineseness” is conspicuously absent. In a society with sig-
nificant ethnic minorities, and where ethnic conflict has led to riots in the
past, a civic approach to nationalism is the only recourse. Hence, “Chinese-
ness” – for the ethnic Chinese majority – is promoted in a bounded way,
e.g., in subjects such as the second language. In the main, the portrayal of
the Japanese is meant to reinforce the National Education messages, which
were introduced as a result of the political leaders’ concern that young peo-
ple were ignorant of recent history and lacked commitment to the country.
In this, the political leaders can only appeal to civic ideals because to do so
in ethno-cultural terms would be socially divisive. For these reasons, history
– and the Japanese Occupation in particular – is used to promote a set of
values and messages, and a form of nationalism, conceived in civic terms. 
Hence, the portrayal of the Japanese is used to foster a set of civic national
values in Singapore, while it serves to reinforce Chinese history and cultural
heritage in Hong Kong; the latter takes the form of an emphasis on "Chine-
seness" in national identity, which contrasts with a predominantly civic con-
ception of local distinctiveness drawing on aspects of the British colonial
legacy and a long tradition of oppositional political activism. The reason for
the different treatment of history relating to the Japanese is the socio-po-
litical context of the two societies, and the vision and goals of the current
leadership. In Hong Kong, the portrayal of Japan is harnessed to the desire
among some of the political elite to bring about deeper union with the
mainland. However, a number of factors have resulted in a vibrant civil so-
ciety in Hong Kong, and a strong culture of opposition to government poli-
cies: these include a free press, a tradition of a colonial government that
was sensitive to public criticism given its low level of legitimacy, (70) a school
curriculum that highlights the rule of law and low levels of corruption as
defining features of Hong Kong, and the fact that many Hongkongers are
descended from refugees who fled the mainland to escape political perse-
cution or famine. The strength of civil society was most evident in the gov-
ernment having to abandon National and Moral Education following large
public protests by those who considered it to be political indoctrination. (71)
In addition, schools in Hong Kong are free to choose their textbooks, and
there are institutions and organisations – such as the religious groups that
run many schools, parents’ associations, student groups, and teachers them-
selves – who represent independent voices in Hong Kong, and challenge the
views of pro-Beijing members of the Legislative Council. In Singapore, five
decades of government by the People’s Action Party has meant a consoli-
dation of the party’s control of the mainstream media and – in education
– the curriculum, as well its ability to infuse into the latter the values and
messages it considers necessary for the survival and wellbeing of the coun-
try and its people. In this, the portrayal of the Japanese Occupation in the
textbooks is informed by the political leaders’ vision for the future, which
includes the promotion of unity by appealing to a conception of nationalism
that is acceptable to the various ethnic groups. 
Conclusion
In the history textbooks of Hong Kong and Singapore, Japan has variously
been depicted as a historical enemy, but also as an “Asian” model to be em-
ulated. The account of suffering under the Japanese is used in Singapore to
unite the different ethnic groups and foster a sense of common national
purpose. In Hong Kong, by contrast, especially since 1997, textbook allusions
to the Chinese struggle with Japan have featured more prominently, or have
been given a more nationalist “spin,” as local officials have sought to pro-
mote closer identification with the “motherland.” Nonetheless, texts in both
places have also presented Japan in a positive light. The Hong Kong texts
acknowledge Japan’s success in its early modernisation and post-war re-
construction, as well as the effect of the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong
on the development of a more participatory approach to local governance.
For Singapore, Japan’s military success is seen as having lessons for its peo-
ple, and is used to reinforce the National Education messages the govern-
ment wants schoolchildren to imbibe. 
There are critical differences in terms of the uses to which the portrayal of
Japan is put, particularly with respect to the role of “Chineseness” in national
identity. For Hongkongers, the focus on mainland suffering during the war is
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part of wider efforts that include the promotion of Chinese cultural heritage,
and are aimed at deepening union between its people and those on the main-
land. This reflects the emphasis of a broader, on-going official campaign of “na-
tional education” that involves appeals to an unequivocally ethno-cultural form
of nationalism. For Singaporeans, Japanese-related history is represented very
differently – as a common experience shared by members of various ethnic
groups, the memory of which can therefore be used to reinforce sentiments
of inter-ethnic solidarity. It is also used to promote other messages and values
that the political leaders deem necessary for the survival of the country; in this,
the form of nationalism appealed to is conceived of in civic terms. 
The elasticity of the interpretation of historical events in these two soci-
eties reflects the very different social and political conditions in which his-
tory curricula have been developed in each case, and the very different
visions of the collective present and future that officials aspire to project
backwards into the past. In Hong Kong, the coverage of Japan’s role in local
history in particular reveals the sensitivity of acknowledging significant ex-
ternal agency in the shaping of the territory’s modern history; hence the
overwhelming focus on the agency of the “local Chinese community” under
colonial rule (British or Japanese). The principal external contribution to
Hong Kong’s development, in the textbook account, is represented as de-
riving from the Chinese mainland. Hong Kong is the unproblematically “Chi-
nese” offspring of an ever-solicitous “motherland.” By contrast, Singapore’s
political leaders, governing a predominantly “Chinese” community situated
amongst the non-Chinese societies of South-East Asia, have seemed eager
to invoke Japan – whether as common wartime enemy or “Asian” exemplar
– for purposes of constructing a broad civic identity that transcends the
“Chineseness” of the majority.
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